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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from an order for new tlial upon a jury verdict rendered in a trial of a
breach of contract claim.' Appellant is Teton Springs Golf & Casting, LLC, owner and
developer of the Teton Springs Subdivision and golf resort near Victor, Idaho ("Teton Springs").
Respondents are Donald and Francine Harger (collectively "the Hargers").' The Hargers brought
this action against Teton Springs for breach of a purchase and sale agreement for the purchase of
lot and model cabin located in the Teton Springs Subdivision.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The Hargers filed their complaint on June 17,2004. R. Vol. I. p. 1-14. By order dated
September 2,2005, the district court granted the Hargers' motion to amend their complaint to
add a claim for punitive damages against Teton Springs. R. Vol. I p. 78. The parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment and both motions were denied. R. Vol. I p. 41 1-508,715-775.
The matter was tried to a jury for 5 days in April, 2006.
At the close of the evidence, the Hargers requested that the jury award the following
items of damages in the following amounts based on evidence that was virtually unrefuted at
trial:

' The district court order also dismissed all claims against certain additional defendants not
named herein. That portion of the district court's order is not at issue on appeal.
The Hargers are residents of Jackson Hole, Wyoming. They are both semi-retired. Tr. p. 35 L.
6 to p. 38 L. 8 (Fran Harger).

1.

The difference between the contract price for the completed cabin and its fair
market value as of the date of the breach: $348,040;

2.

The value of the rebate on the cabin purchase price: $21,000;

3.

The loss of value of plaintiffs' discounted golf club membership: $14,000;

4.

The value of three (3) weeks free cabin rental for three (3) years: $46,621;

5.

The penalty incurred as a result of the failed 1031 property exchange: $22,000.

The total amount of damages claimed by the Hargers was $429,683.00. Tr. p. 863 L. 24 to p.
864 L. 17. By a 9-3 verdict, the jury found that:
(1) a contract existed between the parties as of January 2004;

(2) Teton Springs breached the contract; and
limited
(2) the Hargers' remedy for Teton Springs' breach of the contract was
to the return of their $126,940 deposit under the Default provision of the written
Lot Sale Agreement. (R. Vol. I11 p. 1067-1070.)
The jury then awarded the Hargers $178,000 in damages (inclusive of the return of the deposit,
for a total net damages award of $51,060). R. Vol. I11 p. 1067-1070
The Hargers filed a post-trial motion for additur and/or new trial on the issue of damages
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59 and Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho
438,447, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937), on the grounds that the jury arbitrarily or capriciously
disregarded the Hargers' unrefuted evidence as to the amount of their damages. R. Vol. 111p.
1077 to 1097. Teton Springs opposed the motion. R. Vol. I11 p. 1142 to 1152.
At the hearing on the Hargers' motion for additur and/or new trial on damages, the
district court addressed the following remarks to counsel:

Folks, I've read all your materials. I'll give you another opportunity - suggestion:
Settle this case. I don't know how many times we have to keep going tlvough
that. But I think everybody got an idea of what I was trying to tell you early on.
I'll make the decision on your request, but I think you have one other opportunity
to try to resolve this case without having to go to an appeal.
I'm saying follcs, before I get you a decision in writing that you may have to take
your next step on, you still have the option to resolve this case. You know what
the jury has done with it. And having said that, both of you, there's some
negotiation room there. I think you ought to try to resolve it before you have to
spend the next few years appealing the case.
,

..

Having said that, though, that does give you some time to get this thing resolved.
And I would really suggest again, you've got an offer, you know what the jury
has done, see if you can't get this thing together and put it to rest before I have to
give you a decision that both of you may not like again.
Tr. p. 901 L. 7 top. 904 L. 9.
By order dated July 3 1,2006, the district court granted the Hargers a new trial on all
issues. R. Vol. 111p. 1239 to 1242 (See Appendix, Tab 1). In its order, the district court made
the following specific findings:
the evidence at trial could sustain the jury's fmding that a contract existed
between Teton Springs and the Hargers in January 2004 (Appendix, Tab 1
p. 2-3);
the evidence at trial could sustain the jury's finding that Telon Springs
breached the contract (Appendix, Tab 1 p. 2-3);
the jury's finding that Teton Springs breached its contract with the
Hargers should have entitled Hargers to a minimum of the difference
between the reasonable value of the property at the time of the breach
($875,000) and the contract price of approximately $650,000 (Appendix,
Tab 1 p. 3);
0

the damages awarded by the jury are not consistent with the responses the
jury gave on the verdict fonn and the court cannot reconcile the amount

awarded by the jury in view of the uncontradicted evidence of purchase
price and value (Appendix, Tab 1 p. 2,3);
o

the evidence at trial demonstrated a dispute as to the existence of the other
contract terms upon which the Hargers base their claim for additional
damages (is, the rcbate, the discounted golf club membership, three
weeks free cabin rental for three years, and the penalty on the failed 1031
exchange) (Appendix, Tab 1 p. 3);
if the court had been the trier of fact in this matter, it would have rendered
a verdict in favor of Teton Springs on the grounds that the Hargers
breached the contract when they failed to close on the cabin following the
issuance of the certificate of occupancy, thus excusing Teton Springs &om
fkrther performance under the contract

e

the court, if it had been the trier of fact, and having determined liability in
favor of Teton Springs, would have ordered Teton Springs to return the
Hargers' deposit plus interest at the legal rate (Appendix, Tab 1 p. 2); and
a new trial of this matter could result in a verdict in favor of Teton
Springs, in which case the Hargers would be entitled to recover the same
amount (i.e. the return of their deposit plus interest) as they have already
recovered from the jury upon the verdict in their favor (Appendix, Tab 1,
P 3)

On appeal, Teton Springs seeks to have the court's order for new trial reversed and the
court's entry ofjudgment in favor of the Hargers in the amount of $178,000 reinstated. The
Hargers seek to have the court's order for new trial affirmed, andlor in the alternative, to have
the order modified to include an additur andlor limit the new trial to the issue of damages only.
C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

The written agreements.

As of August 30,2003, the parties had a binding agreement for the purchase and sale of a
lot and model cabin in the Teton Springs Subdivision. R. Vol. I n p. 1044 (Jury Instruction No

7 ) . The terms of this agreement were memorialized in the following series of documents, all of

which were prepared by Teton Springs:
1.

April 19,2003 Teton Springs Contract for Lot Sale, including three year lease-back
model cabin program addendum ("Lot Sale Agreement") (R. Vol. 111p. 1267; Trial
Exhibit No. 5) (Appendix, Tab 2); see also Tr. p. 513 L. 21 to p. 514 L. 7 (Tony Vest);

2.

April 19,2003 letter from Teton Springs Chief Operating Officer, Bill Reid, to the
Hargers confirming that the Hargers are entitled to a $21,000 rebate on the purchase price
of their cabin upon closing (R. Vol. I11 p. 1267; Trial Exhibit No. 6) (Appendix, Tab 3);

3.

April 3,2003 letter from Teton Springs Sales Manager, Jim Gill, to the Hargers
confirming that the Hargers are entitled to one year's free golf membership in the event
that the Hargers refer another buyer who buys property in the subdivision (R. Vol. I11 p.
1267; Trial Exhibit No. 4) (Appendix, Tab 4);

4.

April 26, 2003 letter from Jim Gill to the Hargers confirming reservation of right to
purchase a discounted ($16,000) golf membership and free use of rental cabin for up to
three weeks per year during the three year term of lease-back program (R. Vol. I11 p.
1267; Trial Exhibit No. 11) (Appendix, Tab 5);

5.

April 30,2003 letter from Jim Gill to the Hargers agreeing to consolidate closing of lot
and cabin and change in terms of amount and use of earnest moneyldeposit (R. Vol. 111p.
1267; Trial Exhibit No. 12) (Appendix, Tab 6);

6.

August 30,2003 Model Cabin Sale Agreement with initialed changes to price for
additional upgrades, acknowledgement of receipt of 20% deposit and purchase of
properly as part of a Section 1031 exchange (R. Vol. 111p. 1267; Trial Exhibit No. 25)
(Appendix, Tab 7).
The general outline of the deal between Teton Springs and the Hargers was that the

Hargers would purchase a lot and model cabin kom Teton Springs, Teton Springs would h i s h
and lease the model cabin back from the Hargers for $3,000 per month for three years for use in
its marketing program for the subdivision, and at the end of the lease-back peiiod, the Ilargers
would have the option of placing the cabin into Teton Springs' rental program for an additional

three years. Ti-.p. 42 L. 8 to p. 44 L. 18 (Fran Harger); Tr. p. 563 L. 15 to p. 564 L. 6 (Tony
Vest); Appendix, Tab 2. Under the terms of the rental agreement, Teton Springs guaranteed the
Hargers a rental income of $2,000 per month, with any excess split 50150 between the parties.
Tr, p. 44 L. 4 to L. 18 @ran Harger); Appendix, Tab 2.
Teton Springs sold a total of four model cabins that they built and sold as part of their
model cabin marketing package. Tr. p. 146 L. 16-25 (Don Harger); Tr. p. 505 L. 8-15

o on^

Vest). These cabins were sold at a time when sales for Teton Springs were going poorly, and for
that reason, Teton Springs offered a number of incentives to buyers who were willing to
participate in the model cabin program. Tr. p. 548 L. 14-17; p. 564 L. 3-23 (Tony Vest); Tr. p.
415 L. 13 top. 416 L. 17 (Jim Gill): Tr. p. 288 L. 6-13; p. 319 L. 19-25; p. 320 L. 1-7 (Bill
Reid). Teton Springs also initially under-priced the model cabins, so that by the time
construction on the homes was completed, the contract prices on these homes had become
extremely favorable to the purchasers. Tr. p. 534 L. 1-6; p. 540 L. 13-20; p. 570 L. 9-14 (Tony
Vest); Tr. p. 405 L. 16-25; p. 405 L. 1-5 (Jim Gill): Tr. p. 315 L. 4-25; p. 317 L. 18-25; p. 318 L
1-25 (Bill Reid). In contrast, the models' under-pricing, in combination with construction delays
and cost overruns on the projects, ultimately cause Teton Springs to be in the position where it
was losing money on the cabins under the terms of their original sales contracts. Tr. p. 540 L. 1320; p. 573 L. 4-13 (Tony Vest); Tr. p. 318 L. 1-25; p. 320 L. 8-15 (Bill Reid).
2.

Modification of the defaultlremedies provision.

The Hargers signed their agreement for the purchase of the lot on April 19,2003, and
paid into escrow $21,000 as ea~nestmoney on the lot. Appendix, Tab 2. The closing on the lot

(Appendix, Tab 2, p, 7-8 fj 16) [Emphasis added.] At trial, Teton Springs admitted that the
foregoing default provision of the original Lot Sale Agreement was modified by and was never
intended to apply to the $126,940 deposit tendered by the Hargers under the parties' agreement
to consolidate the two closing dates. At trial, Teton Springs COO Bill Reid testified on this issue
as follows:
And did you - you amended the escrow terms of the Lot Sale Contract;
Q.
did you not, by the April 30th letter?
We added the additional money to the escrow account.
A.
Q.
And amended the terns?
A.
We did.
Now, that was not placed in escrow, was it?
Q.
A.
No, we were able to use that because that's what the agreement of April
30th indicated.
Now, we talked about the earnest money provision and the default
Q.
provision of the Lot Sale Contract a moment ago. Do you recall that discussion?
A.
Ido.
And under that provision the Hargers would forfeit the $21,000 if they
Q.
backed out; correct?
Under that provision and that contract at that time, that was the case.
A.

...

Now, was it your intention or was it discussed that if the Hargers decided
Q.
to change their mind and back out a month or two down the road that they would
forfeit that $125,000 [sic]?
A.
Nobody ever intended for them to forfeit that amount of money.
Okay. And did you intend when you wrote the April 30th letter to be able
Q.
to use that money for six, seven, eight, nine months, and then if you just found
somebody who was willing to pay a little more, to just give that money back?
We intended to use the money. We had no intention of giving the money
A.
back because we found somebody else to buy the place.
Tr. p. 302 L.13 through p. 304 L. 3. Teton Springs CEO, Tony Vest, similarly testified that:
And, in fact, you didn't ever intend; did you, Mr. Vest, to have that money
Q.
and use it for six, seven, eight months and simply find another buyer for a better

price and just give it back to him; did you?
A.
No, we never intended to do that.
Tr. p. 607 L. 15 to L. 19.
3.

Construction is delayed into NovemberlDecember 2004.

It is undisputed that the construction of the model cabins suffered lengthy delays as a
result of problems Teton Springs encountered with its contractors. Tr. p. 81 L. 25 to p. 84 L. 4
@ran Harger); Tr. p. 536 L. 17 top. 539 L. 6; Tr. p. 564 L. 24 top. 566 L. 1 (Tony Vest); Tr. p.
713 L. 14 to L. 18 (Stan Marshall); Tr. p. 305 L. 23 to p. 307 L. 18 (Bill Reid). It is also
undisputed that Teton Springs suffered massive cost overruns in the construction of the model
cabins. In an e-mail from Tony Vest to construction manager, Monte Sutton, Mr. Vest remarks
that: "The overruns on these units are now causing the lots to be given away. Bottom line, finish
the damn things. If a buyer doesn't like it we will give them their money back and sell the unit at
a fair price to someone who does." Tr. p. 570 L. 9 to 19 (Tony Vest)
4.

The parties' agreement was that closing would occur upon completion
and furnishing of the cabin.

At trial, it was undisputed that the parties' agreement expressly provided that closing on
the Hargers' model cabin would occur upon completion and furnishing of the cabins.
(Appendix, Tab 7). In particular, Teton Springs COO, Bill Reid, testified that:
Okay. And under this agreement under Paragraph No. 2 did the parties
Q.
agree to a closing date?
The Paragraph No. 2 says closing will take place on completion of the
A.
cabin construction and furnishing and we agreed to that.
And that was negotiated between Teton Springs and the Hargers; was it
Q.
not?
That was negotiated between Teton Springs and the Hargers.
A.

Okay. And the I-Iargers wanted and you agreed that completion of cabin
Q.
construction and furnishing were two conditions that must occur before closing
could take place; is that right?
A.
We agreed to that.
TI. p. 294 L. 17 top. 295 L. 10.
The closing requirement that the cabin be both completed and furnished was an important
contractual provision to the Hargers, because until the house was completed and furnished, it
could not be leased back to Teton Springs for use as a model cabin, and the Hargers were relying
on the payments from the lease-back agreement to the pay the mortgage payments that would
commence upon closing. Tr. p. 90 L. 13 to p. 91 L. 7 @ran Harger). There is no dispute that
Teton Springs was aware of the fact that the Hargers deemed these requirements for closing to be
important, because when Bill Reid attempted to change these terms for closing in a letter to the
Hargers dated December 5,2003, Don Harger immediately called Jim Gill to object.
Okay. On the next bullet point, No. 2, would you read the first sentence
Q,
please?
"Once the C of 0 -which means certificate of occupancy - "is obtained,
A.
we will move as quickly as possible to close the sale."
Now, the C of 0 on your home had already been obtained in November,
A.
correct?
A.
Correct.

...

All right. Now, go on to read the rest of the bullet point, the rest of the
Q.
paragraph of Bullet Point 2 .
"We will at the same time give the go ahead to the designated designer to
A.
commence the furnishing. We expect substantial completion of the furnishing to
take three weeks or so from the closing. Once the unit is furnished and ready to
be used as a model, we will agree on a date to begin the $3,000 a month lease
back period to be paid after 30 days of model use within 15 days."
Is that provision consistent with the provision in your Model Cabin Sale
Q.
Agreement?
A.
Not a bit. no

Why did you want the closing to occur after the furnishing?
Q.
Otherwise we couldn't have gotten our $3,000 payments. We didn't have
A.
the kind of money to pay out $3,000 a month.
Were you concerned that Mr. Gill - or Mr. Reid, excuse me, was
Q.
attempting to change the terms of your Model Cabin Sale Agreement?
A.
Yes.
Did you bring that concern to anyone's attention on behalf of Teton
Q.
Springs?
A.
Yes, when I received this, which [sic] I called Jim Gill. We'd always
dealt with Jim Gill, and I said, look, this is not what we had in the original
agreement. And Jim went to Tony Vest, he kind of went over Bill Reid and went
to Tony Vest. He said Tony says he's going to keep this the way we agreed to do
it, and I made a note on the bottom memorializing that fact.
So they reconfirmed their original agreement, they would not close before
Q.
the cabin was furnished?
A.
Yes.
Tr. p. 147 L. 16 to p. 151 L. 3 (Don Harger).
At trial, Teton Springs COO, Bill Reid, testified that, regardless of the terms of the
agreement they had in place with the Hargers, the critical consideration to closing for Teton
Springs was the fact that the issuance of a certificate of occupancy on the Harger cabin triggered
the deadline for payment of their construction loan.
And isn't it true that you and Teton Springs -or you felt tremendous
Q.
pressure to complete and close the sale on these homes by the end of 2003?
A.
I did.
Q.
Okay.
I did because of particularly the fact that once we got a certificate of
A.
occupancy, our construction company had a note outstanding, so Teton Springs
was building the cabins. We had contracted with a separate company, Teton
Springs Construction, for them to perform to build that. During the course of
construction there was a construction loan which we were making payments upon.
Once the C of O is issued, the bank comes knocking on your door and asks
you to pay off your construction loan. So I did feel pressure to get this closed.
And we had a second issue in play, the financing for the entire developn~entwas
being considered at that time by Zions Bank. So it would have been very, very

difficult for us to default on the construction loan and then secure the overall
financing from the bank for the property. So there was quite a bit of pressure
Q.
Now, your construction loans were due January 10th; is that correct?
A.
Give or take. I assume you're correct.

...
And you had a grace period of 30 days until February 10th of your loans;
Q.
true?
I don't know that for a fact, but if Tony said it, that must have been the
A.
case.

...

So in your perception, the C of 0 is what triggered the closing, you don't
Q.
care about the agreement you had with the Hargers?
A.
The C of 0 triggered the bank note. The Hargers could have closed with
the C of 0 and they chose not to.
But I'm talking about your agreement with the Hargers that closing would
Q.
occur upon completion of construction and furnishing.
I said that was the agreement that we hoped would occur, but as we look
A.
back, and evidence has already been submitted, there was a demand for a new
agreement that occurred some time between the middle of the month of
November and the 22nd of November, I think, when we submitted our first of the
series of new agreements.

..'

. . . But the important thing was that you close by the 31st, you really
Q.
weren't concerned about your contract with the Hargers at this point in time; were
you, Mr. Reid?
A.
We didn't have a contract with the Hargers at this point in time. We were
renegotiating the deal based on their demand through Jim Gill to write a new
contract.
Now, excuse me. You didn't have an agreement executed on August 30th
Q.
entitled Model Cabin Sale Agreement? I thought we've already been through
that.
A.
As of Aueust 30th. that was our deal.
Okay. Did that not become a deal because the Hargers wanted to put a
Q.
couple of documents into a consolidated agreement? Did this sale A.
As of November Let me finish my question. Did the Hargers somehow indicate to you that
Q.
this document was abandoned, it no longer existed because they wanted to put it
into [sic] one document?
They didn't agree - they didn't indicate that to me expressly.
A.

-

Tr. p. 325 L. 9 to p. 331 L. 17. Teton Springs CEO, Tony Vest, testified that he also had little
regard for the closing conditions set forth in the I-Iargers' contract:
Okay. And if the buyers weren't ready to close by the 3 1st you were
Q.
going to get out of that contract; were you not?
If the buyers weren't ready? If the buyers weren't ready, yes, sir.
A.
Tr. p. 591 L. 8-12.
The certificate of occupancy on the Harger cabin was issued on November 26,2003 (Tr.
p. 807 L. 6-8 (Bruce Nye)); however, an appraisal of the home dated November 24,2003,
indicated that the appraisal value was "subject to completion [of the home] per plans and
specifications." Tr. p. 80 L. 9 to p. 81 L. 3 (Fran Harger). In an e-mail from construction
manager, Monte Sutton, to Tony Vest dated December 19,2003, Mr. Sutton stated that as soon
as the shower enclosures were installed, construction on the cabin will be completed and the
cabin will be ready to close. Tr, p. 314 L. 1-9 (Bill Reid). The cabin, however, was not
furnished until some time in February 2004, because, according to Bill Reid, "We didn't have a
requirement to furnish them. We didn't even have a contract." Tr. p. 355 L. 2-10 see also Tr. p.
658 L. 16 top. 659 L. 20 (Tony Vest).
5.

Punch lists and inspections in December 2004.

One of Teton Springs' defensive theories at trial was that the Hargers unreasonably
prevented defendant's performance under the contract by conducting unreasonable inspections
that interfered with the progress of construction and by refusing to finalize a punch list for the
cabin. R. Vol. I11 p. 1047, 1048 (Jury Instruction Nos. 9 and 10); Tr. p. 528 L. 13 to p. 529 L.

12; p. 571 L. 4 to p. 572 L. 8 (Tony Vest). This theory was wholly unsupported by the evidence
at trial.
With the exception of his vaguely insistent testimony that the Hargers had interfered with
construction, CEO Tony Vest was unable to identify a single instance where such interference
had occurred:
Well, I keep hearing' you use tenns like, "stream of people, parade of
Q.
people, representatives, relatives." I'm trying to get an idea, a specific and clear
detail of who all these people were and when that happened. So far you've only
told me Shane Elder. We don't know when that happened. Keith Harger, and
you can't say whether or not he ever interfered, true?
Well, I can tell you, sir, that Tom Lewis told me and Tom Lewis was the
A.
man in the field and Tom Lewis3told me specifically that every day in December
somebody came through the cabin and held up construction.
Wasn't, in fact, the point man dealing with the Hargers on the preparation
Q.
of the punch list Stan Marshall?
It was Monte Sutton up until probably about the first of December and
A.
then it became Stan MarshalL4
In early December Stan Marshall was sending e-mails back and forth with
Q.
Mr. Harger; is that not true?
A.
That's true.
So Stan Marshall would probably know better than anybody about who
Q.
was doing the inspections on the Harger home; would he not?
A.
From December on, yes.

.. .

Now, did he tell you what he meant by interfering with progress of
Q.
construction? Did Hargers or any expert ever say to any contractor stop the work,
we don't want this going forward?
I know Ms. Allen5had said that. I'm not sure whether the Hargers did or
A.
Teton Springs employee, Tom Lewis, was never called to testify at trial.
"Teton Springs employee, Monte Sutton, was never called to testify at trial.
Richard and Annis Allen were originally named as co-plaintiffs in this action. The 1-Iargersand
the Allcns were very good friends, and the 1-Iargers had referred the Allens to Teton Springs as

nor.

...
Did Hargers ever stop anyone from performing construction on their
Q.
home?
A.
I'm going to let Stan respond to that because I don't recall specifically.

...

Now, as of the present time all we've established and all we know of - or
Q.
you can't even dispute [is] that the first time any professional came in to look at
that was when he [Shane Elder] came in after the 22nd [of December]?
So you're telling me that I'm supposed to believe that nobody came in till
A.
then?
I'm not telling you anything. I'm asking you for your testimony and so far
Q.
you have not been able to identify an expert who came into that home before
December 22nd.
As I've told you, I can't actually identify any experts who came into that
A.
home.
Tr. p. 627 L. 14 top. 630 L. 13; p. 640 L. 24 to p. 641 L. 10 (Tony Vest).
Construction manager, Stan Marshall, gave similar testimony regarding his inability to
identify any particular instance where the Hargers had conducted unreasonable inspections or
had interfered in any way with the construction on the home:
You talked a lot about all the demands and inspections and all the people
Q.
coming through, isn't it true you're lumping in the Annis Allen, the family
inspections of her home, Mr. Marshall? Isn't that true?
A.
Yes.
Okay. Now at your deposition you talked about all the interference from
Q.
Amiis Allen and all those problems; did you not?
A.
Yes.
And that's what you were talking about at your deposition and never once
Q.
at your deposition did you say Hargers interfered with the progress of
construction, did you, sir?
A.
No, but may I explain?

...
Q.

Now, one final thought. You keep talking about how the Hargers were

buyers for the model cabin located next door to the Hargers' cabin. The Allens settled their
claim with Teton Springs prior to trial. R. Vol. 111p. 975 to 990.

unreasonable and interfering and bringing in family menibers and iilspections.
Isn't it true that these inspections did not even begin until mid December, 2003?
A.
I don't know.
Tr. p. 721 L. 8 to L. 22; p. 734 L. 20 to L. 25
The first punch list on the Harger home was prepared on December 19,2003. Tr. p. 567

L. 5 to p. 568 L. 6 (Tony Vest). Prior to the compilation of the first punch list on December 19,
2003, the Hargers had not conducted any formal inspections of the cabin. At trial, Fran Harger
testified to this fact:
Did you or your husband conduct any inspections during this construction
Q.
process?
We did walkthroughs. Because our son is an architect, we had him go out
A.
with us a couple times. As far as any serious inspections, we didn't do any until
at the very end.
Until the very end? And when you say walkthroughs, can you tell the
Q.
jury what you mean by that?
Well, we were - I guess anyone building a home like this you are
A.
concerned and you do walk through to see what the progress is. However, we
probably made, I don't know, maybe not more than one or two walk throughs a
month, and most of them were on the weekends. If we - the couple of times we
took my son out there it had to be weekends because he was always working
during the week and couldn't go with us.
Was there ever a point in time that you or your husband ever interfered
Q.
with the process or progress of construction?
A.
Not to my knowledge.
Did anyone at Teton Springs during July, August, September, October or
Q.
November ever tell you that you or your husband were interfering with the
progress of construction?
A.
No.
Tr. p. 84 L. 10 top. 85 L. 10
The Hargers son, Keith Harger, testified at trial that he had visited the cabin three times
during the entire constiuction period. The first visit in May or early June 2003 was just to see
the site where the cabin would be located. Tr. p. 772 L. 23 to p. 773 L. 9 (Keith Harger)

(Appendix, Tab 9). The second inspection occurred in mid-AugustISeptember, when the
Hargers asked Keith to "come and look at a few particular instances where there were some
things that weren't working in the house and see if I could suggest a possible solution."
Appendix, Tab 9, p. 774 L. 6 to L. 10.
The particular items at issue during the second visit were a stairway built too narrow at
the bottom to meet building code, two (2) closets that had been built too small to hang clothes in,
and a set of kitchen windows that would not open because of the overhang of the gabled roof.
Appendix, Tab 9, p. 774 L. 10 to p. 783 L. 5 (Keith Harger). With regard to each of these items,
Keith proposed an easy and workable solution, all of which were ultimately implemented by
Teton Springs. Id. Construction was never stopped or impeded in any way as a result of Keith's
inspection or recommendations in connection with these issues. Appendix, Tab 9, p. 783 L. 20 to
p. 784 L. 1.
On December 19, 2003, Teton Springs sent the Hargers the first draft of the punch list for
the cabin. R. Vol. 111p. 1267 (Trial Exhibit No. 45). On December 22,2003, construction
manager, Stan Marshall, sent the Hargers a revised copy of the punch list containing corrections
to the values of the some of the items. R. Vol. III p. 1267 (Trial Exhibit No. 47). The December
22,2003 punch list was compiled from a list of items prepared by both Stan Marshall and Don
Harger. Tr. p. 173 L. 19-24 (Don Harger). On December 29,2003, Don Harger met with Stan
Marshall to conduct an inspection of the cabin. Tr. p. 173 L. 9-1 1 @on Harger). On December
3 1, 2003, Stan Marshall again faxed the I-Iargers a revised punch list based on the December 29th

inspection, and requested a meeting with the Nargers later that day to go over it. R. Vol. IJI p.
1267 (Trial Exhibit No. 50).
After the Hargers met with Stan Marshall on December 31st to review the revised punch
list, they requested that they be allowed to have their son Keith perform a final inspection the
following day, January 1,2004. Tr, p. 725 L. 7 top. 726 L. 20 (Stan Marshall). At trial, Keith
Harger testified that the primary reasons for this request was his parents' concern "that there was
a large icicle [an] ice stand forming in front of the house, between the front door and the garage
and was spilling down the side of the building. It started to run out in front of the garage. It was
touching the wall and was a fairly massive piece of ice so they wanted me to look at that and see
if I could offer some - tell them what was going on." Appendix, Tab 9, p. 784 L. 9-17. Keith's
recommendation to his parents, based on the late stage of construction of the cabin and the
various conditions that might be causing the formation of such a massive column of ice from the
roof to the ground, was to simply to request a longer warranty on the cabin. Appendix, Tab 9, p.
787 L. 25 top. 788 L. 8 (Keith Harger).
During his January 1st inspection of the cabin, Keith Harger also observed that each
bedroom was served only by a single, very small heat register. Keith had previously reviewed
the mechanical drawings for the cabin, knew that the system as installed differed from what had
been drawn, and was concerned that the system may not be adequate. For this reason, Keith
recommended that his parents have an expert mechanical engineer evaluate the system to ensure
its adequacy. Keith also advised them that, if it was adequate, "to just live with it and not worry
about the change." Appendix, Tab 9, p. 790 L. 12 to p. 791 1,. 19.

Based on Keith's recoinmendation, the Hargers engaged mechanical engineer, Shane
Elder, to conduct an inspection of the cabin on January 8,2004. The results of that inspection
were faxed to Teton Springs on January 12,2004, and included the following findings:

I believe the heating systems in both residences (Lot 23 & Lot 24) to be
marginally designed and installed, which may result in substandard comfort levels
in some areas. Given the quality of construction, the capacity of the electric
furnaces (20kw) appear to be sufficient for the elltire house, with some less
comfortable areas caused by inadequate air distribution and limitations inherent to
one zone forced air systems on multi-level homes.
Because both residences are near completion, your options for solutions to heating
system deficiencies are limited. I would suggest installing electric toekick or wall
heaters in all bathrooms. I would also suggest installing furnace thermostats with
a Fan ON-OFF subbase which will allow owner to continually operate the furnace
blower without a call for heat; this will help minimize heating system
inadequacies.
R. Vol. I11 p. 1267 (Trial Exhibit No. 70 p. 2). The Hargers did not conduct any further
inspections on the cabin, because Teton Springs canceled their contract the day after it received
the report from the heating engineer. Tr. p. 210 L. 23 top. 214 L. 1. According to Tony Vest,
"They continued to go through the cabins a lot themselves, but then they started sending socalled consultants or people - and it looked like they were just trying to dig up things to keep
from closing." Tr. p. 528 L. 13-16.

6.

Hargers request an integrated agreement; contract negotiations in
December 2004.

Towards the end of November 2003, the Hargers requested that all of the parties' various
written agreements be consolidated into a single integrated document prior to closing. Tr. p.
153. L. 12 to p. 154 L. 24 (Don I-larger). Another of Teton Spring's defensive theories at trial
was that the liargers expressed an intention to abandon their original purchase and sale

agreement as a result of the negotiations that trailspired in connection with the drafting of the
integrated agreement. R. Vol. 111 p. 1047, 1049 (Jury Instruction Nos. 9 and 11); Tr. p. 593 Id.
11- 21 (Tony Vest). In particular, Teton Springs claimed that the Hargers had introduced so
many new terms into the proposed draft of the integrated agreement that they "invalidated the
contract" that the parties had as of August 30,2003. Tr. p. 594 L. 10-20 (Tony Vest).
The items that were proposed by the Hargers and negotiated with Teton Springs during
the period &om December 22 through December 3 1,2003, were the following:
e

the amount of retention to withhold at closing to cover the items on the
punch list

*

a warranty on the log cabin

an extended warranty on the appliances to cover the lease-back period
during which the cabin would not be lived in
a provision showing that they were entitled to a year's worth of
complimentary green fees for referring the Allens as buyers to Teton
Springs

*

a provision regarding payment of personal property taxes
a credit associated with the cost of pavers that were chosen as an upgrade
to the back patio

Tr. p. 159 L. 22 to p. 169 L. 25 (Don Harger). By December 3 1,2003, all but two of these
items had been resolved. The resolution of each of these matters was as follows:
Retention to cover punch list: Hargers originally requested 200% but
conceded to 150%. Teton Springs rehsed to hold back more than 100%.
Tr. p. 160 L. 24 top. 162 L. 11; p. 176 L. 23 top. 177 L. 5 (Don Harger).
e

Warranty on cabin: I-Iargers originally requested 5 years (upon advice of
their son, Keith), but conceded to the 1 year warranty offered by Teton

Springs. Tr. p. 162 L. 12 top. 163 L. 17; 11. 181 L. 19 top. 182 L. 1; p.
191 L. 1-6 (Don Harger).
B

Warranty on the appliances: Hargers originally requested a thee year
extension on the manufacturer's warranty. Teton Springs offered
manufacturer's warranty only. Hargers requested permission to enter the
cabin from time to time to turn the appliances on to check them and keep
them working. Teton Springs said no. Tr. p. 163 L. 18 to p. 164 L. 10; p.
184L. 22top. 185 L. 11;p. 191 L. 7-17 (DonHarger).

o

Complimentary green fees: Hargers had been promised a year's fee golf
membership in the April 3,2003 letter from Jim Gill. They misunderstood
this incentive to mean "green fees" (neither of the Hargers golf). Despite
the written offer they had from Teton Springs entitling them to the golf
membership, they conceded this request during negotiations. Tr. p. 164 L.
11 top. 166L. 18;p. 182L. 14top. 183L. ll@onHarger).

e

Personal property taxes: This provision was mistakenly suggested by the
Hargers' attorney, Frank Hess, and was taken out. Tr. p. 166 L. 19 to p.
167 L. 8; p. 182 L. 2-9 (Don Harger).
Cost of pavers: The Hargers believed there was a discrepancy in the price
of the pavers they were charged for. Tr. p. 168 L. 3 to p. 169 L. 25 @on
Harger). What they sought was an explanation as to the amount charged.
At trial, Teton Springs contended that the Hargers were "trying to
renegotiate the price of the lot." Tr. p. 608 L. 3 top. 61 1 L. 10 (Tony
Vest); Tr. p. 248 L. 19 to p. 249 L. 4 (Don Harger).

Thus, as of December 31,2003, the only items still being negotiated were the amount of
money to be held back as a retainer on the punch list and the warranty on the appliances during
the term of the lease agreement. See R. Vol. 111. p. 1267 (Trial Exhibits 26,49, 50,54, 55, 56,
57) (collectively, Appendix, Tab

Nevertheless, Teton Springs maintained at trial that the

During the negotiation over the additional terms in the integrated agreement, Teton Springs also
attempted to introduce new terms into the integrated draft, including an arbitration provision.

"cumulative nature" of the ncw te11ns and the time it was taking to resolve them demonstrated to
Teton Sp~ingsthat the Hargers had no intention of ever closing on this cabin:
Okay. Now the Hargers -you had the Hargers' down payment and they
Q.
had patiently wanted for their home to be completed from July into December;
isn't that true?
A.
Well, why wouldn't they close then?
Well, why if they had waited patiently for six months were you now
Q.
telling them you've got two weeks to inspect this home, finish your inspection
and close by the end of the year?
A.
Because we had to get a contract signed and we had already passed up
multiple opportunities to sign contracts and close.
Q.
Isn't it true it wouldn't have hurt Teton Springs at all to postpone it a little
longer, a few weeks to get the punch list finalized and get it in place, there would
have been no harm, damage or loss to Teton Springs at all by A.
We could have and that wasn't the way it was going. It was going towards
non-closure. We were getting further apart, particularly on the punch list items.
Tr. p. 660 L. 17 to p. 661 L. 19 (Tony Vest).
7.

Teton Springs cancels the Ilargers' contract.

On December 31, 2003, after their meeting with Stan Marshall to inspect the cabin, the
Hargers met with Bill Reid and Richard and Annis Allen at the offices of Teton Springs to
discuss the remaining integrated contract negotiations. Tr. p. 172 L. 2-18 (Don Harger)). At the
close of this meeting; Bill Reid mailed a letter to the Hargers and the Allens summarizing the
status of the those negotiations, and stating that:

' This is a factual dispute as to when the Hargers and the Allens first received this letter. Bill
Reid testified that he prepared it in advance of the meeting and handed copies to the Allens and
Hargers at the start of the meeting. Tr, p. 379 L. 9 to p. 380 L. 20. However, Annis Allen
testified that they were never given this letter at the meeting. Tr. p. 426 L. 13-19. Annis Allen
testified that she never received a copy of the letter (it was only mailed to the Hargers), Tr. p.
427 L. 23 top. 428 L. 2, and Don Harger testified that he did not receive this letter until he
received it in the mail on January 7,2004. Tr. p. 193 L. 4-7.

I am looking forward to closing and at closing will jointly sign all
documents including the one we drafted on the 3 1st. I will extend the close date
to January 5th, which should allow each party time to finalize documents.
Should either the Hargers or the Allens chose not lo close or be unable to
close through no fault of Teton Springs by January 5th, the original agreement
will be canceled and Teton Springs will move forward with alternate plans to
satisfy obligations on these properties.
Appendix, Tab 9 (Trial Exhibit 56). At trial, Annis Allen testified that, in light of the amount of
notice they were given, it would simply not have been possible to conduct a closing on Monday,
January 5,2004:
Was that ever discussed with Mr. Reid at that meeting, this closing on
January 5th?
He mentioned that, but I couldn't understand how we could close when we
A.
was trying to work on an agreement to put everything together and it was remember, the next day was New Year's, you had Friday, you had Saturday and
Sunday and then we was supposed to close on Monday? I couldn't see that
happening.

Q.

Tr. p. 427 L. 10-17. Similarly, Jessica Nead, the Harger's loan officer, testified that the
requirements had not been met to conduct a closing on January 5,2004, in part because Teton
Springs had never sent a copy of the certificate of insurance or the insurance binders to the
Harger's lender so that the loan could fund. Tr. p. 465 L. 7 to p. 476 L. 12.
From December 31,2003, through January 12,2004, the Hargers engaged in numerous
conversations and contacts with Teton Springs with the intention and expectation that they were
moving towards a closing on the cabin. Tr. p. 195 L. 21 to p. 199 L. 14; p. 208 L. 5 to p. 210 L.
18 (Don Harger). Teton Springs never once mentioned the purported January 5th closing to the
Hargers during any of the conversations that transpired from December 3 1, 2003, to
Jauuary 12, 2004. Tr, p, 197 L. 12-17 (Don I-Iarger); Tr. p. 385 L. 22 to p. 386 L. 22 (Bill Reid).

On January 7,2004, Teton Springs sold the I-Targers' cabin for $745,000 lo V&R
Investments, LLC, a Michigan company owned by Teton Springs COO, Bill Reid, and his
business partner Vladimir Volchko. R. Vol. 111. p. 1267 (Trial Exhibit 66) (Appendix, Tab 11).
On January 13,2004, Teton Springs' attorney, Roy Moulton, sent the Hargers a letter stating that
their contract had been canceled and tendering the return of their deposit in satisfaction of all
claims. R. Vol. I11 p. 1267 (Trial Exhibit 72).
At trial, it was undisputed that the sale of the Hargers cabin by Teton Springs to insider
Bill Reid was not an arm's length transaction. Tony Vest testified that the cabin had been sold to
V&R Investments "at cost," Tr. p. 533 L. 13 to L. 15, and Bill Reid testified that: "That was not
a negotiated price. So Tony offered that price to us or anybody who we could find to buy that
cabin." Tr. p. 390 L. 12-16. Three months later, on March 6,2004, V&R Investments sold the
Hargers' cabin to a third party buyer ("the Chipmans") for $875,000. R. Vol. 111p. 1267 (Trial
Exhibit 75) (Appendix, Tab 12).
11.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(d)(5)?

B.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by not limiting the new trial to the
issue of damages only?

C.

Are the Hargers entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3); Erickson v. F&nn, 138 Idaho 430,
64 P.3d 959 (Ct. App. 2002); and Idaho Appellate Rule 40?

111.
A.

ARGUMENT

The district court did not err in granting the K-Targers a new trial because the
requirements for granting a new trial have been met iu this case.

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(d) provides that: "A new trial may be granted to
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the following
reasons: . . . (5) Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice."
Whether the trial court was correct in granting a new trial or in the alternative an additur
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840
P.2d 392, 394 (1992). When reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion by the trial court, the

Court must determine: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its specific choices
available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Swallow v. Emergency Med. ofldaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 590,67 P.3d 68 (2003).
In acting within the outer boundaries of its discretion on ruling on a motion for new trial,
the trier court inust first consider whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence so
that the ends of justice would be served by vacating the verdict, and next consider whether a
different result would follow a retrial. Burggraffv. Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171, 173-174,823 P.2d
775 (1991).

1.

The district court properly determined that the damages awarded by
the jury were not supported by the weight of the uncontradicted
evidence of record.

The district court should grant a new trial or additur for inadequate damages only if, after
assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, it determines that the
verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence. Puckett v. Verska, -Idaho -,
158 P.3d 937 (2007); Hudelson v. Delta Int 'I Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244,248, 127 P.3d 147,
151 (2005). When the district court believes that substantial and competent evidence supports
the verdict but its assessment of damages substantially diverges from the jury's award of
damages such that only passion or prejudice could explain it, then it should grant a new trial or
an additur. Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556,558,961 P.2d 647,649 (1998). "Indeed, it has not
only been held that the trial court may set aside a verdict which is contrary to the evidence, but
that there is a positive duty upon the trial court to do so." Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628,
632,769 P.2d 505 (1987).
The moving party need not prove that passion or prejudice affected the jury's verdict; the
appearance alone is sufficient to justify a new trial or additur. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,
625-26,603 P.2d 575,580-81 (1979). The existence of passion or prejudice appears when the
jury ignores or disregards unrefuted evidence at trial. Puckett, 158 P.3d at 944 (holding that
passion or prejudice appeared to have affected the award of damages where jury awarded
nothing for economic damages even though the defendant never introduced evidence to refute
medical expense and income claims); Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 627,603 P.2d at 575 (holding that a
verdict of $540 over the uncontradicted ~nedicalexpenses and lost propelty with apparently no

lost wages at all "suggested a verdict appearing to have been rendered under the influence of
passion or prejudice.")
In its order granting a new trial, the trial court correctly obsemed that "the damages
[awarded by the jury] are not consistent with the responses the jury gave on the verdict form."
Appendix, Tab 1 p. 2. In particular, the court found that: "The jury determined that Teton
Springs breached their contract with the Hargers. That finding, coupled with their answer that
the contract did not limit damages to a return of the down payment, should have entitled Hargers
to a minimum award of the difference between the reasonable value of the property at the time of
breach . . . and the contract price . . . ." Appendix, Tab 1 p. 3. Such an award should have been
given because "[the Hargers] alone provided evidence regarding damages for contract breach."
Appendix, Tab 1 p. 3. Given these factors, the Crial court found that it "cannot reconcile the
award of $178,000 in view of the uncontradicted evidence of purchase price and value."
Appendix, Tab 1 p. 3.
Teton Springs contends that the hial court's determination that the jury's award of
damages is irreconcilable with its liability findings fails to demonstrate "an exercise of reason"
because "there were multiple factors the jury could consider in factoring damages." Appellant's
Brief, p. 17. Teton Springs then proffers an example of how the jury might have selected any
two items of damage and added them together to arrive at an amount in the neighborhood of
$178,000. Appellant's Brief, p. 18.
This argument is without merit for the reason that under the rule in Pierstorffv. Gray's

Auto Slzop, 58 Idaho 438,447,74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937), cited in Dinneen v. Finclz, 100 Idaho

620, 625-26,603 P.2d 575, 580-81 (1979), the jury was not free to arbitrarily or capriciously
disregard

of the unrefuted evidence that was submitted in support of the Iiargers' damages

claim. During the tiial, Don Harger testified that the fair market value of the home at the time
Teton Springs breached the contract was $875,000. Tr. p. 433 L. 20-24. Mr. Harger testified at
length regarding the reasons supporting that value figure, including the fact that Teton Springs
COO, Bill Reid, resold the property to a third party purchaser for that price only three months
later on March 6,2004.' Tt. p. 433 L. 10 top. 442 L. 10, p. 449 L. 12 to p. 461 L. 15 (Appendix,
Tab 13).9
Teton Springs made virtually

attempt to challenge or impeach Mr. Harger's damages

evidence, and offered no evidence refuting the values testified to by Mr. Harger. The only
evidence offered by Teton Springs in rebuttal to Mr. Harger's damages evidence was the
testimony of Teton Springs CEO, Tony Vest, that "other costs" that needed to be considered. Tr.
Mr. Harger also explained that he had considered all of the appraisals on the property, including
the Getling appraisal in November for $650,000 and the Phillips appraisal in December for
$732,000. Mr. Harger also considered the Margo Beldin offer in September of $753,900 and the
price that Teton Springs sold the home to Bill Reid and his company, V&R Investments, of
$745,000. Mr. Harger testified that of all of the figures, the Chipman contract was the only
contract that trnly reflected the fair market value at the time of breach, because it is the only
evidence of what a "willing buyer" would pay a willing seller in an "open marketplace."
Appendix, Tab 13.

In its brief, Appellant contends that the court erroneously used, without reference to the
evidence, the sale to the Chipmans as its source of the market value of the cabin at the time of
breach and that "nothing was ever found by the court that suggested the sale to V&R was not a
bona fide transaction." Appellant's Brief, p. 18-19. To the contrary, both Mr. Reid and Mr. Vest
testified at trial that the sale from Teton Springs to Bill Reid and his partner in V&R Investments
an arm's length transaction. See Tr. p. 533, L. 13-15 (Tony Vest); Tr. 11. 390, L. 12-16
was
(Bill Reid).

p. 546 L. 11 to p. 547 L. 13 (Appendix, Tab 14). Mr. Vest, however, failed to opine what the
precise nature or amount of these "other costs" might be that could be used to offset the Hargers'
damages, and particularly how such costs were to be identified and/calculated in light of the
lease-back and rental agreements that would have covered the Hargers' mortgage payments for
at least the first six years of ownership. Appendix, Tab 14.
Teton Springs also failed to contest the fact that each of the items of damage claimed by
the Hargers stemmed from the express terms of the parties' written agreements. To the contrary,
Mr. Reid and Mr. Vest both testified that Teton Springs had agreed as part of its contract with the
Hargers that:
1,

the Hargers were entitled a $21,000 rebate on the cabin purchase price; Tr. p. 289 L. 7 to
p. 290 L. 20 (Bill Reid); Tr. p. 551 L. 10 to p. 560 L. 22 (Tony Vest);

2.

the Hargers could purchase a golf club membership at a discounted price; Tr. p. 288 L. 6
to L. 13 (Bill Reid); Tr. p. 551 L. 10 top. 560 L. 22 (Tony Vest);"

3.

the Hargers were entitled to three (3) weeks free cabin rental for tlzree (3) years after the
end of the lease-back period; Tr. p. 288 L. 14 to L. 21 (Bill Reid); Tr. p. 551 L. 10 to p.
560 L. 22 (Tony Vest);

4.

the Hargers would purchase the model cabin as part of a Section 1031 property exchange
Appendix, Tab 7 (Bill Reid); Tr. p. 551 L. 10 top. 560 L. 22 (Tony Vest).

Bill Reid also testified that the Hargers were entitled to complimentary green fees for the golf
course as a result of referring their friends the Allens as another buyer in the Teton Springs
subdivision. Tr. p. 291 L. 7 to 21. The Hargers conceded these fees in their negotiations with
Teton Springs over the integrated contract. Tr. p. 266 L. 6 - 12 (Don I-larger).
'O

111 fact, Teton Springs CEO, Tony Vest, testified that "I think up until probably November there
was no request that 1 can recall that we didn't accommodate." Tr. p. 520 L. 21-23."
There is no evidence in the record anywhere showing that the contractual terms upon
which the Hargers based their claim for damages were not part of the contract that was breached
by Teton Springs in January 2004. Nor is there any evidence of record to refute the values
assigned by the Hargers to each of their items of damage. Because there is nothing in the record
to show that Don Harger was anything less than a credible witnesses, and his testimony was not
inherently improbable, "or the jury.

..to disregard his testimony on anypoint, includingfair

market value, was error." Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 625-26,603 P.2d at 580-81. For this reason,

the district court correctly found that the jury's $178,000 damages award was unsupported by the
weight of the evidence in this case and that the ends of justice would be served by vacating the
verdict in favor of a new trial.
2.

The district court properly determined that a different result would
likely result upon retrial.

If the court determines that that verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, the
court must additionally determine that a different result would follow a retrial. Blaine v. Byers,
91 Idaho 665,670,429 P.2d 397 (1967). In their opening brief, Teton Springs contends that this
determination has not been satisfied in this case because the district court, in its order granting
The district court's finding that "other contract terms for which Hargers sought damages were
disputed by Teton Springs" is clear error. Nowhere in the record does Teton Springs claim that
the rebate, discounted golf membership, lease-back agreement, rental program agreement, or
part and parcel of the parties' purchase and sale agreement as of August
1031 exchange were
30,2003.
I'

the Hargers a new trial, stated that: "This Court is not satisfied that a new trial will alter the
ultimate outcome in this case because the amount awarded is approxiinately what this Court
would have awarded on the evidence presented at trial." Appendix, Tab 1 p. 3.
At first glance, this sentence does appear to be in direct contradiction with the trial
court's decision to grant a new trial. However, a careful reading of this sentence, in light of the
meaning of the court's order as a whole, yields a more consistent result. The district court
correctly identifies the problem that a liability verdict in favor of the Hargers cannot be
reconciled with the amount of damage awarded, but that the damages awarded could be
reconciled to a liability finding in favor of Teton Springs. Teton Springs suggests that this
means that, either way, the I-largers are likely to be awarded the same damages if this matter is
re-tried. This argument is without merit.
If the matter is retried and a liability verdict is found in favor of Teton Springs, the
Hargers may be awarded the same damages as they recovered in the first trial. BUT, if the case
is retried and a liability verdict is found again in favor of the Hargers, the Hargers are & likely
to receive the same award of damages, because, as the district court correctly points out, an
award of $178,000 in damages cannot be reconciled as the amount of damages caused by Teton
Springs' breach of the contract in the face of unrefuted evidence to the contrary. Only the
influence of passion or prejudice explains the result that was rendered in this case, and there is no
reason to believe that the same passion or prejudice would produce similar results upon re-trial.
Based on all the of the findings presented by the district court in its order granting a new
trial, one of two results is likely to occur if this matter is retried. Either the jury will change its

verdict as to liability and sustain its award of damages to the Hargers, or the jury will sustain its
verdict as to liability and change its award of damages to the Hargers. No matter which of these
results happens, there is a strong probability that the outcome will be different than the verdict
currently under review.
The district court demonstrated that it understood the discretionary nature of the decision,
the legal boundaries within which the decision should be made, and it exercised reason in
reaching its result. See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803
P.2d 993, 1001 (1991). For this reason, the court's order granting a new trial should be affirmed.

8.

The district court abused its discretion by not limiting the new trial to the
issue of damages only.

"The purpose of limited retrials is to expedite the administration ofjustice by avoiding
costly repetition." Smallwood v. Dick,114 Idaho 860,864,761 P.2d 1212, 1216 (1988). In
determining if the district court abused its discretion in restricting a trial to the issue of damages,
we must "conclude that (1) the damages awarded by the jury were inadequate, (2) the issue of
liability was close, and (3) other circumstances indicated that the verdict was probably the result
of prejudice, sympathy, or compromise, or that for some other reason, the liability issue was not
actually determined by the jury." Id. (citing Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal.2d 462, 247 P.2d 324
(1952)).

In this case, the record supported an order granting an additur andfor limiting a new trial
to the issue of damages only. The trial court clearly found that the damages awarded were
inadequate, fulfilling the first factor of the test in Leipert.

The second Leipert factor is also met in this case because there is no evidence to suggest
that liability was a close issue in this case. At trial, Teton Springs initially advanced the theory
that they never entered into a contract with the Hargers for the sale of property. Tr. p. 25 L. 15
to p. 26 L. 6; p. 114 L. 13-16.'' By the time the matter was ready for deliberation by the jury,
Teton Springs had abandoned its frontline position, when it agreed to the submission of the
following jury instruction: "There is no dispute between plaintiffs and defendant (Telon
Springs) that as of August 30, 2003, there was such a contract between them regarding the sale
and purchase of the lot and model cabin which are the subject of this dispute." R. Val. 111p.
1044 (Jury Instruction No. 7).
Wit11 regard to each of the defensive theories advanced by Teton Springs at trial, the
followingjury instructions were each properly issued:

Jurv Instruction No. 8: The plaintiffs (Hargers) have the burden of proving each
of the following propositions:
A contract existed between plaintiffs and defendant, Teton Springs Golf &
1.
Casting, LLC (Teton Springs);
2.
Teton Springs breached the contract;
That plaintiffs have been damaged on account of the breach; and
3.
4.
The amount of damages.
If you find fiom your consideration of all of the evidence that each of the
propositions required of the plaintiff has been prove, then you must consider the
issue of the a f h a t i v e defenses raised by the defendant, and explained in the
next instruction. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any
of the propositions in this instruction have not been proved, your verdict should
be for the defendant. (R. Val. I11 p. 1046)

I Z Question by defense counsel to Francine Harger: "You're aware that Teton Springs denies that
any contract ever resulted between the two parties, you know that that's our position as we come
into court today?"

Jurv Instruction No. 9: 111this case the defendant (Teton Springs) has asserted
certain affirmative defenses. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of
the affirmative defenses asserted.
1.
Defendant asserts that plaintiffs unreasonably prevented defendant's
performance under the contract.
2.
Defendant asserts that the plaintiffs' actions indicated their intent to
abandon the terms of the contract.
3.
Alternatively, plaintiffs' remedy for any breach of the contract is -by the
contract itself - a return of plaintiffs earnest moneyldown payment.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these
propositions has been proven by the defendant, then your verdict should be for the
defendant. If you find from your consideration of the evidence that none of the
propositions has been proven, then the defendant has not proved the affirmative
defenses alleged in this case. (R. Vol. I11 p. 1047)
Jurv Instruction No. 10: The defendant, Teton Springs, has asserted the defense
of prevention of performance. The defendant has the burden of proving that
plaintiffs unreasonably prevented or substantially hindered the defendant's
performance of the contract. If this affirmative defense is proved, the defendant is
excused from performance. (R. Vol. I11 p. 1048)
Jury Instruction No. 1I: A contract is abandoned where both parties expressly
abandon the contract, or where one party acts in a manner indicating an intention
to abandon the contract, and the other party acquiesces therein. Abandonment of
a contract is a question of intent. It may be implied from the parties' actions. If
the contract is abandoned, the law leaves the parties where it finds them. (R. Vol.
111p. 1049).
In addition to the foregoing instructions, the jury's verdict form contained three independent
special interrogatories by which the jury could specifically address the viability of each of the
affirmative defenses explained in these instructions and advocated by Teton Springs at trial. Yet
despite each of these opportunities, the jury still issued a verdict with a finding of liability in
favor of the Hargers. On the basis of this record, there is no indication that the jury found the
liability issue in this case to be a close one.

With regard to tlie possibility of a compromise verdict, the district court "does not point
to any particular circumstances in the record to suggest that the verdict on liability was subject to
compromise." Puckett, 158 P.3d at 944. To the contrary, as this Court stated in its opinion in

Smallwood:
While only nine of the twelve jurors signed the special verdict, this in itself does
not demonstrate that the verdict was a compromise. Any implication that may
arise from this fact weighs in favor of the verdict not being a compromise, since
the dissenters, whether they would have voted for no liability or for more
damages, did not concur, and therefore, could not have caused compromise. The
fact that the jury awarded the plaintiffs less than the amount of special damages
that was supported by the unrebutted evidence at trial also does not prove that the
verdict was a compromise.

Smallwood, 114 Idaho at 865,761 P.2d 1217.
Again, the strongest evidence in favor of the fact that the jury's verdict was not
compromised is the answers given by the jury on the special verdict form. The first three
questions on that form ask:
OUESTTON NO. 1: Was there a contract, in January of 2004, between plaintiffs
and defendant (Teton Springs) for the purchase and sale of a lot and model cabin?
QUESTION NO. 2: Did Teton Springs breach the contract with the plaintiffs?
QUESTION NO. 3: Did the parties intend by their contract that the plaintiffs'
sole remedy for Teton Springs' breach of contract was to be the return of
plaintiffs' down payment?

R. Vol. III p. 1062-1063. If the jury had been struggling with the issue of whether or not to hold
Teton Springs liable for breach of the contract and damages caused to the Hargers stemming
from that breach, the jury had not one, but three, separate opportunities on the verdict form to
avoid that consequence. 111addition to a finding that Teton Springs did not breach the contract,

the jury had the option of either fiuding that no coniraci had ever existed; or finding that the
Hargers' remedy was limited to the return of their deposit. Yet, in answer to all tlree of these
questions, the jury found in favor of the Hargers.
The trial court's suggestiong3that what the jury had attempted to do was to find liability
in favor of Teton Springs but still leave the Hargers with no out of pocket losses is belied by the
fact that the verdict form provided the jury with exactly this opportunity - and they chose not to
take it. The jury's verdict indicates that the jury clearly found in favor of the Hargers, but,
disregarding the undisputed evidence regarding the measure and amount of the Hargers'
damages, calculated instead what it deemed to be an adequate rate of return on the deposit as its
compensation for the breach. The actions of the jury, while unquestionably wrong, do not give
rise to the suggestion of a compromise verdict.

In light of the undisputed evidence demonstrating the extent of the Hargers' breach of
contract damages and the absence of any indication of the jury's failure to determine liability in
this ease, the district court abused its discretion in not considering and applying the Liepert test
to the Harger's request for an additur andlor new trial on the issues of damages only.

IV.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

The Hargers respectfklly submit that they are entitled to a reasonable attorney fee on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3); Evickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430,64 P.3d 959
(Ct. App. 2002). Respondent also requests an award of costs based on Idaho Appellate Rule 40.

'Tootnoie 2 in Appendix, Tab 1.

V.

CONCLUSION

Prejudicial error has crept into illis record such that substantivejustice has not been done.
The district court correctly ordered a new trial in this case pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 59 and Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447,74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937), as
the appropriate remedy for the jury's obvious and capricious disregard of the undisputed
evidence of the damages suffered by the Hargers as a result of Teton Springs' breach of their
contract to purchase the lot and model cabin. For this reason, the order of the district court
should be affirmed and remanded to the district court in accordance with the orders of this Court,
or in the alternative, modified to include an additur andlor to limit the new trial to the issue of
damage only.
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